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Abstract 
This paper presents a model of second-degree price discrimination and inter-group effects to 
describe the full-service pricing behaviour in the passenger aviation market. Consumer 
heterogeneity is assumed on both a horizontal and a vertical dimension, while various distinct 
market structures, some of which include low-cost carriers (LCCs), are considered. In the theoretical 
model framework, we derive that the rivalry between full-service carriers (FSCs) reduces fare 
differences between the business and leisure segments. Furthermore, the presence of LCCs 
increases fare gaps between leisure and business travellers, and it also induces FSCs to decrease 
fares in the leisure segment and eventually to increase them in the business one. This last outcome 
emerges from a change in passenger arrangements caused by inter-group effects. In our empirical 
analysis, we use data on published airfares of Lufthansa, British Airways, KLM and Alitalia for the 
main city-pairs from Italy to Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. Our results show that the 
empirical results provide support for our theoretical propositions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Carriers’ pricing behaviour in interurban airline connections has been amply investigated in 
transport economics research. Among the many theoretical works describing airline pricing policies, 
most are based on the third-degree price discrimination approach. Borenstein and Rose (1994), for 
instance, describe a single-route market consisting of two segments: business and leisure travellers, 
each demanding flight services from one or more carriers. Since consumer segments are 
heterogeneous in terms of demand elasticity and brand allegiances, airlines find it profitable to price 
discriminate by charging full fares to less-elastic brand-sensitive business travellers and discounted 
fares to more-elastic less brand-sensitive leisure travellers.  
This simple story, which succinctly describes the functioning of third-degree price 
discrimination, was often utilized to criticize the dominant view that price dispersion is positively 
related to market concentration. Indeed, it is possible to show that, by moving from monopoly to 
imperfect competition, price differentials increase in those cases where fares for brand-sensitive 
business travellers decrease less than those for less brand-sensitive leisure travellers (Borenstein, 
1985; Holmes, 1989). This result is used as a theoretical support for a wide empirical literature which 
found a negative relation between price dispersion and market concentration in the airline market 
(Borenstein, 1985, Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Stavins, 2001; Giaume and Guillou, 2004) as well as in 
other service markets (Asplund et al., 2008, Borzekowski et al., 2008).  
The underlying assumption behind the third-degree price discrimination argument is that the 
leisure and the business markets are independent, i.e. business travellers do not (or are not allowed 
to) buy tickets meant for leisure travellers, and vice versa. In other words, whatever the gap 
between leisure and business fares, carriers do not face ‘passenger diversion’, i.e. there is no 
demand switch of business travellers towards less expensive fares. 
Relaxing the assumption of market independency moves the analysis toward a second-degree 
price discrimination approach (Stole, 2007), where the previous argument (i.e. increasing price 
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differentials in more dispersed markets) continues to hold only when carriers are able to design 
different product qualities (e.g. ‘unrestricted’ vs ‘restricted’ fares) and price differentials remain 
below the business traveller quality premium (i.e. the additional value that a business traveller 
receives from choosing an unrestricted fare with respect to the restricted one). 
The literature on revenue management abounds with examples of where passenger diversion 
may occur in airline markets (Botimer and Belobaba, 1999; Zhao and Zheng, 2001; Zhang and 
Cooper, 2005; Alderighi, 2010). This motivates our choice to abandon the simplifying assumption of 
market independency and to analyse airline pricing policies using the more sophisticated approach 
of second-degree price discrimination.  
One important consequence of this choice is that, when a route is operated by a monopolist, 
which is forced to satisfy the quality premium constraint, the entry of a competitor cannot expand 
price differentials, except when there is a positive shift in quality premium. We do indeed show that, 
when we compare a market configuration with one (full-service) carrier with that of two (full-
service) carriers, we find that price differentials decrease or, at least, remain stable. The former 
occurs when the quality premium constraint ends up being slack, and the latter when it remains 
binding. Price dispersion,  can even increase under second-degree price discrimination if we observe 
an expansion of the leisure market. 
In our set-up, we also consider the case where the quality premium may be influenced by 
passenger arrangement. Business-traveller, as well as some leisure-traveller, evaluations for a flight 
may be affected by the participation of some passengers whose behaviour may have a negative 
impact (e.g. noisy travellers may reduce the ability of business travellers to work during the flight, 
and therefore their willingness-to-pay (WTP). If these inter-group effects play a role (Leibenstein, 
1950; Becker, 1991; Katz and Spiegel, 1996), a market structure which induces a sorting of noisy 
travellers may increase the quality premium of business travellers. In particular, the co-existence of 
full-service carriers (FSCs) and low-cost carriers (LCCs) may favour a change in passenger 
arrangement, since LCCs, by charging low fares, can attract those passengers who are not interested 
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in comfort and are mostly motivated by low prices. A more ‘selected’ arrangement of FSC 
passengers can, therefore, expand the quality premium and raise price differentials. Eventually, it 
can increase fares in the business segment.1 Therefore, this set-up does not exclude that price 
differentials may increase, but it limits this possibility to a case in which there is a carrier asymmetry. 
Our modelling choice is based on the recent literature on second-degree price discrimination 
in oligopolistic markets. A general set-up is provided by Rochet and Stole (2002) and Armstrong and 
Vickers (2001) and further analysed by Dessein (2003) and Ellison (2005).2 Here, the authors allow 
for both horizontal and vertical differentiation between firms, endogenous quality choice, and 
partial coverage of the weak segment. A main conclusion is that the standard result of ‘quality 
distortion at the bottom’ (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) disappears and efficient quality allocation is 
usually provided.3 A similar outcome has been obtained by Alderighi (2008), when considering 
competition among asymmetric players. These results also lead to a re-evolution of some of the 
previous analyses based on exogenous quality provision (Moorthy, 1984; Katz, 1984). We take this 
short cut in our set-up because the previous literature shows that exogenous quality choice is not a 
severe limit.  
This paper is also related to the work of Liu and Serfes (2006) and Hernandez and Wiggins 
(2009), who provide a model of second-degree price discrimination, under the assumption that the 
quality premium constraint remains binding in all market structures, and competition intensity is 
measured by the transport cost parameter (Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr, 1999). Their main 
                                                          
1
 Other theoretical works find that market dispersion has a price enhancing effect (Blattberg and Wisniewski, 
1989; Perloff et al., 1996; Ward et al. 2002; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2004; Chen and Riordan 2006; Alderighi, 
2009). None of these, however, combines the inter-group effects with a multi-output pricing firm. 
2
 A comprehensive review of the early works in the field is provided by Armstrong (2005). 
3
 At least, when the participation of some consumers belonging to the lower segment is guaranteed. In fact, 
Yang and Ye (2008) show that, if there are some segments that remain totally unserved, the number of players 
increases, and quality distortion exibits a non-monotonic pattern. 
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findings are that the business to leisure price ratio decreases with competition, and there is a U-
shaped relation between concentration and price dispersion. Finally, Justin and Myatt (2003), using a 
model of quality competition, showed that competition from newcomers usually occurs in the lower 
segments, with the consequence of pruning or reducing the incumbent participation in that 
segment. A similar situation emerges in our set-up when considering low-cost entry. 
In the second part of the paper we will test some of the theoretical outcomes in order to 
verify their correspondence to the factual situation. In the empirical part, we will use half-yearly data 
on the airfares of Lufthansa, British Airways, Alitalia and KLM for the top 41 city-pairs from Italy to 
Europe (April 2001-July 2003). Contrary to what is done in most of the literature, we do not consider 
average prices, but perform an analysis on the basis of eight different fare classes identified by using 
a class map procedure. 
Our empirical findings provide support to the theoretical set-up. First, it emerges that the 
entry of LCCs consistently reduces the fares charged. This result is in line with previous works in the 
field (Bennett and Craun, 1993; Whinston and Collins, 1993; Morrison and Winston, 1995; Windle 
and Dresner, 1995; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008). Moreover, we find that the rivalry between (FSCs) 
reduces fare differences between the business and the leisure segments. This is in line, for instance, 
with the findings of Evans et al. (1993) and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). Finally, the presence of LCCs 
induces FSCs to decrease fares in the leisure segment and to maintain and possibly increase them in 
the business one, implying that the gap in price between leisure and business tickets increases. A 
similar effect has been noted in the retail industry, where top-premium national brands have 
increased their prices after the introduction of store brands (Ward et al., 2002; Pauwels and 
Srinivasan, 2004) and in the fast food industry where the appearance of a closer competitor may 
slightly increase prices (Thomadsen, 2005). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 
3 provides a description of the data, the estimation procedure, and the main results. Section 4 
concludes. Details of the proofs are presented in the Appendix. 
5 
 
2. The Explanatory Model 
 
The model we are going to present can, in principle, be applied to all contexts where firms charge 
prices following a second-degree price discrimination strategy. However, we have chosen to position 
our discussion in the airline market context. 
2.1 Design of the model 
We analyse a market where consumers are both horizontally and vertically heterogeneous and incur 
interpersonal externalities. Vertical heterogeneity captures the different evaluation for quality and is 
related to travel motivations. In general, business travellers have a more rigid demand and, 
therefore, higher WTP for high quality products (e.g. unrestricted ticket) than leisure travellers. We 
refer to the business segment as the strong market (labelled 2), and to the leisure segment as the 
weak market (labelled 1). The WTP for quality of travellers belonging to the strong market and the 
weak market is, respectively,    and   , with       , i.e. both types of consumers appreciate 
quality, although the consumers belonging to the strong market are more interested in quality than 
the others. 
Horizontal heterogeneity is summarized by the location of consumers on a circumference of 
unitary length, on which, it is supposed, “products”, i.e. flights, are also located. This approach is 
particularly appealing for the airline sector as different points on the circumference can represent 
travellers’ ideal departure time, or the ideal locations of the origin and destination airports (in 
addition to the usual brand preference argument). Travellers who choose a flight which does not 
fully correspond to their ideal choice are subject to a constant unit transport cost  . Since business 
travellers are less flexible that leisure travellers, we set the unit transport cost of business travellers 
   larger than that of leisure travellers    , i.e.:      . 
Interpersonal externalities come from a set of reasons, such as status signalling, preferential 
attachment, and group behaviour. In particular, it is supposed that the quality of a flight is affected 
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by the composition of passengers and by carrier reputation. We assume that business travellers, as 
well as a certain proportion         of leisure travellers, evaluate positively having comfortable 
and quiet seats on the flight, and the proportion     of leisure travellers do not, simply because 
these are those from whom such environmental externality originate. Similar to Corneo and Jeanne 
(1999), we model the inter-group externalities of consumers of type   for the flight   as: 
            
                       -                   
              
    (1) 
where    and    are, respectively, the proportion of leisure travellers who evaluate positively being 
quiet (type    ) on the flight and the proportion who do not (type    );     is a measure of the 
intensity of inter-group externalities; and       captures the preferential attachment, i.e. the 
psychological cost sustained by passenger when they fly on an LCC. It is, therefore, zero when 
passengers choose to fly with an FSC, and is equal to   ,      and     , when passengers 
choose to fly with an LCC and are of type    or     and    , respectively. 
We assume that both groups of travellers are uniformly distributed around the circumference, 
and have  -  demand, and we normalize consumer mass to 1; the size of the weak market is 
          , and the size of the strong market is       ;   is set equal to 
 
 
 for computational 
reasons4. The utility that a traveller   located at   who purchases a flight of quality    from firm   
located in    at the price     is given by: 
                        ,     (2) 
where     is the inter-group externality of being in flight  ,         is the shortest time distance on 
the circumference from the location of the consumer   to that of firm  . Travellers will choose the 
product that provides the maximum utility. The net utility of the outside option is normalized to 
zero. Note that we are, thus, modelling a situation where heterogeneous consumers are free to 
choose among different qualities and suppliers. 
                                                          
4
 This implies that, when identically located consumers patronize the same carrier,        . 
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There are two types of firms on the market, FSCs (namely,  ) and LCCs (namely,  ). They differ 
with regard to two aspects. FSCs can offer products of different qualities: a premium product    and 
a standard product    (e.g. unrestricted and restricted tickets), while LCCs can only offer a standard 
product    (e.g. restricted tickets).
5 Moreover, LCCs have a cost advantage in production. Let     be 
the unit cost of firm   for a product of quality  ; therefore, we have:            .
6 In other 
words, traditional firms can offer a full range of products but at higher cost, while low-cost firms can 
offer a restricted range of products but at lower cost. To simplify the notation, let       ,     
   , and                , for        . Note that         for      , and             
   . This last inequality is known in the literature as the single crossing property (Mirrlees, 1971).  
We also assume that carriers are not able to explicitly segment consumers on the basis of 
passenger location on the circumference nor on the basis of passenger WTP. Implicit segmentation 
(i.e. which allows carriers to sort consumers by inducing self-selection) is viable only on the vertical 
dimension, because the single crossing property does not hold on the horizontal one. Since there are 
two product qualities, and two segments, the traditional strategy for FSCs is to offer the product of 
lower quality    to the weak market, and the product of higher quality       to the strong market. 
Carriers, to avoid diversion, i.e. that a    -type consumer will buy a product designed for   -type 
consumers, must choose     and     , such that the net utility that a   -type consumer receives 
when she buys a product of quality   , is at least equal to her net utility when she buys a product of 
quality   . This means in formal terms:                . This inequality may also be written 
as: 
                                                          
5
 The FSC offer includes a wide range of characteristics, e.g. in-flight entertainment, fast check-in, waiting 
lounges, ground services, which further help to differentiate the product. 
6
 The cost differences between FSCs and LCCs are amply documented. The advantages of low-cost carriers are 
mainly due to their organization (Franke, 2004). On the other hand, the cost difference between business 
tickets and leisure tickets is usually explained by differences in the quality of service and by the higher implicit 
cost of business seats caused by differences in the load factors (Dana, 1999; Escobari and Gan, 2007). 
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         ,      (3) 
where           is the quality premium of travellers belonging to the strong market. This 
condition is known as the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) for the strong market.7  
The simultaneous presence of different firms on the market expands the traveller’s choices 
and makes firm’s decisions more complex. We refer to a case where fares are such that, if a 
consumer decides to fly, she definitely purchases from the closest firms and chooses the fare 
designed for her type, i.e. all FSCs price schedules satisfy the ICC for the strong and the weak 
markets, and that fares are such that undercutting does not occur (we are excluding super-
competitive market outcomes, see: Salop, 1979). According to the utility function presented in (2), a 
consumer of type    purchases one unit of product from the firm providing the highest utility. 
Consider the arc on the circumference between firm   and firm  .8 The consumer    who is 
indifferent between purchasing from the two firms is given by: 
                                                   .   (4) 
A traveller of type     belonging to the arc of circumference    located in    will patronize firm   if 
                 , and firm   otherwise. Semi-market demand for firm   by consumers of type   
is therefore given by:           , where    is the number of consumers of type    on the market, 
and where     (i.e business travellers),    (i.e. leisure travellers evaluating positively being quiet 
                                                          
7
 Analogously, a carrier when designing a product for the weak market has to consider how to induce leisure 
travellers to buy the product designed for them. The incentive compatibility constraint is said to be binding 
when a firm chooses the prices of high quality and of low quality products in such a way that high WTP 
consumers are indifferent between buying a high quality product at a high price and buying a low quality 
product at a low price. On the contrary, the incentive compatibility constraint is said to be slack when prices 
are set in such a way that consumers of the strong (weak) market will strictly prefer a high (lower) quality 
product to a low (high) quality product. Throughout the paper, we will only discuss the ICC for the strong 
market since the ICC for the weak market is always slack. 
8
 When there are two firms we have to define arcs by considering, for instance, counter-clock wise directions. 
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on the flight) or    (the other leisure travellers). Previous analysis also accommodates the monopoly 
case by assuming a fictitious firm providing the reservation utility zero at each point on the 
circumference. 
In the next sub-sections we will analyse four main market structures depending on whether 
there are one or two FSCs and one or no LCCs (see Figure 1): 
1. Monopoly: one FSC   on the market, located on the circumference at     ; 
2. Symmetric duopoly: two FSCs on the market: namely,    and    , equidistantly located on 
the circumference, respectively, at      and    
 
 
; 
3. Asymmetric duopoly: one FSC   and one LCC    equidistantly located, respectively, at 
     and    
 
 
; 
4. Asymmetric oligopoly: two FSCs    and   , equidistantly located, respectively, at      and 
   
 
 
, and one LCC   in between, located at    
 
 
;  
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Figure 1. Presentation of Various Market Structures 
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2.2 Monopoly Analysis 
The Previous literature suggests that monopoly analysis in the case of both horizontal and vertical 
differentiation produces a large set of cases depending on whether the incentive compatibility 
constraint (ICC) is slack or binding, and on the different coverage of the weak and the strong markets 
(see Desai, 2001; Alderighi, 2007; Yang and Ye, 2008). In order to simplify the analysis (and to 
provide more stringent predictions), we consider the case that, from our viewpoint, is the most 
relevant for the airline market. We therefore study the pricing behaviour in monopoly markets 
when, in equilibrium, the quality premium constraint is effective (the ICC is binding), and the 
monopolist serves all business travellers (full coverage of the business market) and some of the 
leisure travellers (partial coverage of the weak market). The assumption concerning a binding quality 
premium can be explained by the diversion argument: if a carrier tries to increase its fares in the 
business segment above a certain level, some business travellers will decide to buy a less attractive 
but much cheaper ticket. This risk is much more concrete in the monopoly, case as the lack of rivalry 
with other carriers does not reduce its fares. Empirical analysis also motivates our hypothesis on 
market coverage. It is observed that traffic usually increases by moving from monopoly to more 
competitive environments, and that, since business demand is quite rigid, most of the increases are 
usually caused by leisure passengers. These effects are, for instance, clearly documented on those 
routes where LCCs enter the market, e.g. the ‘Southwest effect’ (Morrison, 2001). In mathematical 
terms, this situation is obtained under the following assumptions (derived in the Appendix): 
             (full coverage of the strong market)  (5) 
                      (partial coverage of the weak market)  (6) 
                    ,    (binding ICC),     (7) 
where            .  
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We are therefore considering a case in which the utility that business travellers receive (net of 
production costs) is sufficiently high; the utility that leisure travellers receive (net of production 
costs) is small; and business travellers have some interest in the tickets of leisure travellers. Under 
Assumptions (5)-(7), the profit-maximizing behaviour of the monopolist is: 
                
                             (8) 
The first-order condition implies that: 
    
 
 
                and             .    (9) 
Due to the quadratic form of the profit function, second order conditions are satisfied. Let    
   , for future reference. 
Note that, as a result of our modelling choice, the existence of inter-group effects does not 
affect the pricing decision nor the carrier profitability. In fact, the carrier cannot profitably sort 
travellers belonging to the weak market into two sub-segments: by raising the price in the weak 
market, the carrier obtains a simultaneous reduction of the number of potential travellers who want 
to fly in each sub-market, and therefore the inter-group effects are null, i.e. from (1), when both 
sub-segments participate, then      , and therefore:             . In order to obtain positive 
inter-group effects in the monopoly case, an FSC should increase the fare charged in the weak 
market in such a way as to fully exclude the participation of    -type consumers (       ). In that 
case, the carrier is able to guarantee a participation type     only if inter-group externalities are 
strong. We exclude this scenario from our analysis by assuming: 
         .       (10) 
The following proposition summarizes the results presented in this sub-section. 
Proposition 1. Assume that inter-group externalities are described by (1) and that assumptions  (5)-
(7) and (10) hold, then: 
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a) in equilibrium, the monopolist fully covers the strong market, partially covers the weak 
market, and ICC is binding; 
b)  equilibrium prices are described by (9). 
 
We will now compare the results derived in this sub-section with those derived in the following sub-
sections. 
2.3 Symmetric duopoly analysis 
In the symmetric duopoly case, we restrict our analysis to situations where both markets are 
covered. We consider two cases, depending on whether the ICC is binding or not. When the ICC is 
not binding, markets are separate, and the Vickrey (1964)–Salop (1979) outcome emerges in both 
segments (Rochet and Stole, 2002):  
       
 
 
  ,            (11) 
Note that, by moving from a monopolistic situation to a more competitive one, pricing strategies 
vary from those based on WTP to those based on the ability of firms to differentiate their products.9  
From (2) and (11), full coverage of the weak market occurs when:         
 
 
  . Therefore, for any 
  and   , there is a parameter set for which we have simultaneously full-coverage of the weak 
market in the duopoly case and partial coverage in the monopoly case: 
        
 
 
                  .    (12) 
The results are not particularly affected by assumption (12) that is mainly motivated by the need to 
reduce the number of possible cases to be analysed. Using (3), we find that the ICC is slack when 
                                                          
9
 With a similar argument to that of the monopoly case, inter-group externalities do not play a role in the case 
of symmetric duopoly. 
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cost differences (i.e. transport costs and production costs) are smaller than the quality premium, i.e. 
                   . Let        and         . The second case, when the ICC is 
also binding in duopoly (   ), is more widely analysed in the Appendix, where we show that the 
equilibrium prices are the result of a mixture of the transport and production costs of both 
segments:  
      
 
 
                                 
      and            . (13) 
Note that, by moving from monopoly to duopoly, we expect that price differentials decrease or, at 
least, remain stable. The former implies that, in the duopoly case, the ICC is slack, while the latter 
that the ICC remains binding. Contrary to the third-degree price discrimination approach, this result 
emerges irrespective of the fact that the business demand is more rigid than the leisure demand.  
In order to link this set-up with the recent literature on price dispersion, it is useful to analyse 
percentage price differentials in monopoly and duopoly. Using (9) and (11), it is simple to prove that 
if the monopoly-to-duopoly price ratio in the weak market       is lower (higher) than    , then 
percentage price differentials are larger (smaller) in monopoly than in duopoly. Moreover, when the 
ICC is binding (   ), the model predicts a positive shift in percentage price differences, while, when 
the ICC is slack (   ), both situations can be accommodated. In the second case, since   is 
positively affected by      , our outcome is in line with the argument put forward by Holmes 
(1989) and Borenstein (1985): the larger the difference in the brand strength between passengers 
belonging to the strong and the weak markets, the more likely the (percentage) price differentials 
are increasing. 
Predictions concerning a higher or lower price dispersion caused by a change in the market 
structure may also be accommodated by the model. We use as a measure of price dispersion the 
coefficient of variation, i.e.                       
   
   , where 
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                           where    and    are, respectively, the total number of 
passengers of the leisure and business segment.10 Simple computations imply that: 
    
        
               
,         
                        
                  
.    
The comparison of the two expressions is not straightforward.11 Different parameter values push in 
different directions. As in the previous case, a remarkable role is played by the monopoly-to-duopoly 
price ratio in the weak market        and by the quality premium to cost difference ratio    . In 
addition to this, since in the monopoly equilibrium the weak market is only partially covered, 
traveller composition plays an additional role. In particular, the characteristics of the    imply that, 
for a given       and    , price dispersion is more likely to increase in those market configurations 
where the size number of business and leisure travellers is more similar. This prediction is consistent 
with the findings in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) where price dispersion in ‘big-city routes’ 
characterized by both business and leisure travellers is higher than in ‘leisure cities routes’. 
The following proposition summarizes the above analysis. 
 
Proposition 2. Assume that inter-group externalities are described by (1) and that assumptions  (5)-
(7), (12) hold, then: 
a) markets are fully covered; 
b) equilibrium prices are described by (12) when     and by (13) when    ; 
c) when    , the ICC is not binding (i.e. price differences moving from the monopoly to the 
duopoly case decrease) and, when    , the ICC is binding, 
                                                          
10
 The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. When considering only two 
fare levels, the coefficient of variation is double the Gini coefficient. 
11
 Simulations confirm that the results are consistent with the informal treatment that we are going to present. 
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d) moving from monopoly to symmetric duopoly, percentage price differences decrease when 
          ,and increase when            and 
e)  if percentage price differences decrease then the ICC is slack. 
 
Some of these implications are tested in the empirical part (Table 4). 
2.4 Asymmetric duopoly analysis 
In this section, we focus on the entry of an LCC in a monopolistic market. Contrary to the previous 
cases, we show that inter-group externalities affect the equilibrium outcome. In particular, we will 
show how these effects increase full-service price differentials, and that they can eventually induce a 
rise in the FSC’s fares in the strong market. Intuitively, the presence of an LCC induces a different 
allocation of the two sub-segments of leisure travellers between the two carriers. The LCC attracts 
more    -type travellers and less    -type travellers. Consequently, a lower share of    -type 
travellers increases the valuation of   -type and    -type consumers for a flight operated by an FSC. 
In the asymmetric duopoly case, we assume that there is an FsC, located at 0, and an LCC 
located at    . The low-cost carrier has a competitive advantage in costs, but it cannot provide the 
full range of products (i.e. it is not able to produce the quality   ). As an LCC cannot provide a high 
quality product for type   , it offers the same quality for both markets, which corresponds to   . 
Depending on the level of vertical heterogeneity, the LCC may, or may not, attract business 
travellers. We focus on the case in which, the FSC has no competition on the strong market.12 It 
corresponds to a situation in which    and    are sufficiently high, i.e. it is ‘too costly’ for a business 
                                                          
12
 There is some empirical evidence that in the EU aviation market, LCCs target some business travellers. 
However, our data refer to an early stage of market liberalization, where the share of business travellers who 
considered flying with an LCC was quite small. 
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traveller to choose an LCC. Consequently, business fares are only subjected to the quality premium 
constraint that, under similar conditions to the monopoly case, is binding. 
Due to the presence of LCCs,    -type and    -type consumers located in the same place may 
prefer to patronize different carriers. Using equations (1) and (2), the utility a    -type traveller 
located in   receives when patronizing the FSC is:                                 , and 
the utility she receives when patronizing the LCC is:                                 
  , where      and      are, respectively, the number of    -type and    -type passengers 
travelling with the FSC; and    is a measure of the preferential attachment. Note that    -type 
evaluation is affected by the composition of passengers,            , and by the ‘brand’ 
evaluation   , i.e the traveller is damaged by flying in a less prestigious, or a less comfortable carrier. 
For    -type consumers, there are no inter-group externalities and, therefore, the evaluations for 
the FSC and LCC offers are, respectively:                    and                  .  Let 
    and     be the corresponding indifferent consumers for the two types. Therefore (details on the 
rest of the model are provided in the Appendix):  
                            .    (14) 
Note that, since the ICC is binding, the price charged in the strong market is such that a business 
traveller is indifferent to buying a ticket of quality    and a ticket of quality   , both offered by the 
FSC. However, since          , the existence of inter-group effects implies that           , 
where                                  Moreover, if the price charged by the FSC in the 
weak market is not too low when compared with the price charged in monopoly, the existence of 
inter-group effects may cause higher business fares in the asymmetric duopoly case than in the 
monopoly case. Solving the maximization problem of the FSCs and the LCCs, equilibrium prices are 
(see the Appendix): 
   
 
 
                    ,          (15) 
    
 
 
                         and                            ,    (16) 
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where                     . The following proposition summarizes the main results of this 
sub-section. 
Proposition 3. Assume that inter-group externalities are described by (1) and that assumptions  (5)-
(7), (12) hold, then: 
a) equilibrium prices are given by: (15)-(16); 
b) price differentials between the business segment and the leisure segment are higher in the 
asymmetric duopoly case than in the monopoly case; and 
c) for a sufficiently high cost differential        , fares are lower in the asymmetric duopoly 
case than in the monopoly case in the weak market but higher in the strong market. 
2.5 Asymmetric oligopoly analysis 
In this sub-section we analyse the case where there are two FSCs equidistantly located and an LCC 
positioned between them. This market is characterized by two relevant aspects. First, in the weak 
market, FSCs sustain quite strong competition, due to the proximity of the LCC, but they also benefit 
from inter-group externalities. Second, the strong market competition remains similar to that of the 
symmetric duopoly case, since competition among the FSCs eliminates (when    is sufficiently high) 
both the possibility to exploit inter-group externalities and the competitive pressure of lccs. 
Therefore, although the oligopoly game is complex, a simple solution can be obtained since the 
pricing behaviour of FSCs are separate between the weak and the strong market. In fact, equilibrium 
prices in the strong market are given simply by equation (11), while in the weak market, prices are 
obtained by the interplay of the three firms. The methodology to find the market prices in the weak 
market is similar to that of the asymmetric duopoly case and is reported in the Appendix. We find 
that: 
   
 
  
   
 
 
          
 
 
      
        
;    (17) 
    
 
  
   
 
 
         
 
 
      
        
.    (18) 
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The following proposition summarizes the main results of this section. 
Proposition 4. Assume that inter-group externalities are described by (1) and that assumptions  (5)-
(7), (12) hold, then:  
a) prices in the strong market are not affected by the presence of an LCC and are given by (11), 
and equilibrium prices in the weak market are given by (17) and (18); 
b) price differentials between the business segment and the leisure segment are smaller in the 
asymmetric oligopoly case than in the asymmetric duopoly case; 
c) for a sufficiently high cost differential        , price differentials between the business 
segment and leisure segment are higher in the asymmetric oligopoly case than in the 
symmetric duopoly case. 
3. Empirical Analysis of European Airfares 
3.1 Data 
Data for this analysis refer to the first years (2001-2003) after the end of the European airline 
deregulation process (1988-1997) which were characterized by some important changes. First, most 
of the national carriers were privatized or partially privatized and started adopting sophisticated 
pricing techniques (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2005). Second, although carriers had the freedom to adjust 
their network structure in accordance with their needs, network modifications were quite limited. 
For instance, the European routes analysed in this work maintained the same full-service operators 
for all the period of analysis, and the FSCs operating the routes were based in the country of one of 
the endpoints of the route. Third, a consistent growth of LCC was observed, even if at the end period 
(July 2003), in 41 selected routes, we continued to observe a market dominance of the FSCs for most 
of the city-pairs.  
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The main source of data is posted fares retrieved from the computer reservation system 
Galileo for 41 city-pairs in the period April 2001 - July 2003. The fares concern operating non-stop 
direct flights between Italy and three European countries: UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
involving four legacy carriers, viz. Lufthansa (LH), British Airways (BA), Alitalia (AZ), and KLM(KL). The 
use of city-pairs is usually preferred to that of airport-pairs when the analysis also involves LCCs, as 
entry often occurs in secondary airports (see, e.g., Nero, 1998). 
Apart from the limitation concerning the duration of the period under evaluation and the 
number of destinations, this data has the value of including detailed information on booking class, 
cabin, ticketing restrictions, etc. An in-depth analysis of fare characteristics was conducted in order 
to obtain the eight homogeneous fare classes reported in Table 1. 
Usually, carriers label classes with capital letters. For example, the promotional classes of 
Alitalia are O and N, while those of Lufthansa are V or W. Our classification is obtained by analysing 
the ticket characteristics of the four FSCs for each of their classes, and assigning each original class of 
each carrier to one of the eight classes valid for all the carriers. The main attributes, that we have 
taken into account are ticket characteristics (ticket cancellation, travel date change penalties, 
purchase time limits, or minimum stay at the travel destination, Sunday rule, etc.) and ground 
services (flight fast check-in, VIP waiting lounges).13 
Additional information concerning passengers, flows, frequencies, and seats offered on anbi-
annual basis has been collected from OAG databases and airport authorities. Information on socio-
demographics on origin and destination areas has been collected from the Eurostat Euregio 
database. 
Table 1 – Class mapping of carriers’ airfares 
                                                          
13
 The choice to use a class mapping procedure to classify different fares comes from the observation that high 
collinearity among fare attributes (which are usually nested, moving from the lowest to the highest fare), 
makes their simultaneous use in the estimation difficult (Stavins, 2001). 
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TYPE OF FARE      std.   
(8 classes) (3 classes) AZ KL BA LH mean dev min max 
          
Promotional Leisure O-N V-T Q-N W-V 167 33.9 99 295 
Discounted 1 Leisure W-T L V-L Q-H 276 60.1 165 411 
Discounted 2 Leisure Q K M M 361 58.7 240 494 
Economy 1 Intermediate B B K-H B 454 102.3 300 732 
Economy 2 Intermediate M S B-I B 580 100.3 320 838 
Unrestricted 1 Business Y Z Y Y 815 161.0 440 1092 
Unrestricted 2 Business I C D D 887 151.7 558 1171 
Unrestricted 3 Business C J J C 898 207.5 574 1459 
 
Contrary to US data, we do not have information on ticket fares but only on posted fares. Although 
this is a major shortcoming for the analysis of European markets, in this specific case this is not 
critical since we are interested in studying the change in the fare schedule in different market 
structures, and not, for instance, fare dispersion (where quantities matter). 
The construction of the sample begins by converting posted fares into half-yearly information. 
We take three different steps. First, we exclude one-way fares from the analysis. This is justified 
because one-way tickets are rarely sold by FSCs in the European market. Second, we have 
transformed the raw data on posted fares into monthly data (obtaining 14,152 different airfares), 
and added information on the presence or absence of LCCs on the route. Within the sample, we 
have 12 city-pairs with the following LCCs: Ryanair, easyJet, Basiqair, Volare Web, British Midland, 
Air Berlin, Virgin Express and Hapag Lloyd Express.  Finally, to match the data frequency of other 
sources, as well as to account for pricing practices of carriers, we convert previous observations into 
bi-annual data, averaging information by period, route and carrier. To be consistent with OAG 
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practices, the  semesters are called Winter (which lasts 5 months from November to March) and 
Summer (which lasts 7 months from April to October). The resulting database of 1269 observations 
concerns 41 routes, 4 carriers, 8 fare classes for 5 periods (semesters).14 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
VARIABLE MEAN STD. MIN MAX 
  DEV.   
     
FARE 6.1173 0.5862 4.7767 7.2855 
LCC 0.0784 0.1481 0.0000 0.6364 
SHARE 0.7236 0.2768 0.1456 1.0000 
FSC 0.5145 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 
ENPL 0.5117 0.1409 0.2335 0.8698 
DEN 0.5125 0.3564 0.1638 1.4136 
 
3.2 The empirical model 
Our econometric approach is based on the following specification: 
                                              
 
         ,   (19) 
                                                          
14
 This is an unbalanced panel since some carriers on specific routes and in specific periods do not post all the 
class fares. In particular, some promotional fares are often not posted by Alitalia or Lufthansa, and likewise, 
some other economy and business fares may not be posted by KLM. This is an additional rationale to 
aggregate the initial 8 classes into 3 main classes. 
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where          is the log fare charged by carrier   on route   in period   for a ticket class        is the  
route carrier fixed effect;    is the  period fixed effect;          is the passenger share of carrier   
on route   in period           is dummy variable for fare class     and       is the market share of 
LCCs on route   in period   (number of frequencies over the total).  
Some extensions include the following dummy variables:       
    is a dummy variable for the 
presence of a second FSC when the fare is intended for leisure travellers (fare classes 1, 2 and 3), and 
      
    is a dummy variable for the presence of a second FSC when the fare is for business 
travellers (fare classes 6, 7 and 8). 
The previous literature has emphasized the risk of endogeneity of the variables       and 
    that can be potentially correlated with the error process. Standard econometric techniques 
suggest, therefore, that equation (19) should be estimated using instrumental variables (IV). A valid 
instrument for the variable      , proposed by Borenstein (1989) and afterwards utilized by 
Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), is        , the ratio between the 
geometric mean of enplanements of carriers at the two endpoints and the sum across all carriers of 
the geometric mean of each carrier’s enplanement at the endpoints. 
Endogeneity issues on the variable     are more serious because they concern one of the 
main variables of interest in our analysis. Endogeneity should derive from the fact that LCCs are 
attracted by most profitable markets and FSC fares are also positively related to market profitability. 
Therefore, if market profitability is not in the explanatory variables, the error process is positively 
correlated with the low-cost variable, and the estimated fare reduction due to the entry of an LCC is 
underestimated.  
The recent literature suggests that it is difficult to find valid instruments for the entry of LCCs 
(see Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009). Berry (1992) suggested that the presence of an LCC on the two 
endpoints of a route increases the probability of entry on this route. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) 
used this variable in order to capture the potential entry of an LCC, and showed that FSCs react to 
the threat of entry by reducing their prices some months before the entry. However, their analysis is 
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quite different from ours, because they selected only those routes in which entry occurs, and 
therefore do not account for those routes that were less affected by LCCs entry decision. In our 
analysis, we cannot rely on this variable since the European market in 2001-2003 has a very different 
structure from the US market. In our study, since there were no bases of LCCs in Italy, this variable 
was always zero.  
We therefore decided to provide a new instrument for the presence of an LCC: the potential 
demand on the route. The proposed instrument is clearly correlated with the entry decision of the 
LCCs (since they want to enter dense markets: see, e.g., Boguslaski et al., 2004; Sinclear, 1995), but is  
marginally correlated with the error process, since FSC profitability is mainly affected by some 
unmeasurable variable such as the industrial relations among linked areas, etc. We choose to 
measure the potential demand with       , that is, the geometric average of the population density 
in the regions of the two endpoints (in thousands of inhabitants per square kilometre). This variable 
is preferred to a measure of the population, which is more affected by the size of the region under 
consideration.15  
3.3 Empirical results 
Equation (19) is estimated using panel fixed effects, including a carrier-route fixed effect and a time-
period fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by route in order to control for autocorrelation, as 
well as for correlation between carriers on the same route. The results are reported in Table 3. All 
                                                          
15
 The European geographical partition of Member States is based on the NUTS (Nomenclature of Statistical 
Territorial Units) classification. The size of NUTS territorial areas is quite heterogeneous, since it corresponds 
to the administrative division of countries which are quite different.  We use the NUTS1 classification for the 
UK, the Netherlands and Germany, and NUTS2 for Italy. 
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the models are estimated with the two-stage instrumental variable estimator, apart from Model 1 
that presents the ordinary least square estimates.16  
Models 1-2 show that the market share of      on a route has a negative impact on FSC 
fares. In order to measure the impact of the entry of an LCC, we have also estimated the model using 
a dummy variable for the presence of LCC. The results are quite similar, but the use of the route 
share of LCCs increases the significance of the coefficient. This reflects that the pricing behaviour of 
an FSC is more affected when there is a larger involvement of LCCs. 
The coefficients of fare classes are statistically significant and have the expected ordering. We 
choose CLASS4 as the reference class. As expected, the coefficients of the lower classes have a 
negative sign, and those of higher classes a positive one. In those cases, where we split the sample 
by classes (Models 3-5), the reference class for the leisure segment is CLASS3, for the intermediate 
segment it is CLASS4, and for the business segment it is CLASS8. The coefficient of SHARE has the 
right sign but, in most of the estimates, is not significant (see below, for an explanation).  
                                                          
16
 The Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test in some estimates rejects the assumption of exogeneity of     
and      . We therefore decided to consider these variable as endogenous in line with the current 
literature. The qualitative results are not affected by this choice. (Estimates where one or both variables are 
considered exogeneous are available upon request.) Standard tests for the detection of weak instruments are 
applied. For Model 2, the F-statistics for excluded instruments for     and       are, respectively, 11.83 
and 52.79, which are above the value suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) for identifying weak instruments. 
We also test the instrument relevance comparing the Shea partial R-squared with the Bound et al. (1995) 
partial R-squared. Both statistics provide similar values for the two variables suggesting that the model is fully 
identified (in both cases, the partial R-squared is  0.19 for     and 0.42 for      ). 
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Table 3 – Main estimations (dependent variable:     ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS 
FULL SMPL 
IV 
FULL SMPL 
IV 
LEISURE 
IV 
INTERM. 
IV 
BUSINESS 
IV 
FULL SMPL 
IV 
NO LCC 
IV 
ONLY LCC 
         
    -0.0896** -0.235** -0.454** -0.304** 0.107* -0.237**  -0.406** 
 (0.0452) (0.105) (0.206) (0.149) (0.0593) (0.105)  (0.197) 
      0.0267 0.0568 -0.0485 -0.174 0.0894*** 0.0746 -0.0141 0.290** 
 (0.0719) (0.0761) (0.140) (0.136) (0.0306) (0.0792) (0.127) (0.133) 
            0.0617* 0.119*** 0.0563 
      (0.0355) (0.0443) (0.0399) 
            -0.00465 -0.0164 -0.0671 
      (0.0380) (0.0363) (0.0541) 
       -0.992*** -0.994*** -0.755***   -1.023*** -0.970*** -1.089*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0293) (0.0222)   (0.0257) (0.0337) (0.0314) 
       -0.550*** -0.553*** -0.309***   -0.586*** -0.582*** -0.603*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0184)   (0.0231) (0.0324) (0.0280) 
       -0.240*** -0.240*** ―   -0.269*** -0.272*** -0.279*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0179)    (0.0182) (0.0273) (0.0192) 
       0.274*** 0.271***  0.284***  0.271*** 0.267*** 0.275*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0120)  (0.0112)  (0.0117) (0.0180) (0.0141) 
       0.563*** 0.560***   ― 0.565*** 0.494*** 0.649*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0280)    (0.0405) (0.0497) (0.0533) 
       0.676*** 0.672***   0.119*** 0.679*** 0.612*** 0.752*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0274)   (0.00984) (0.0390) (0.0426) (0.0518) 
       0.691*** 0.691***   0.247*** 0.695*** 0.649*** 0.801*** 
 (0.0249) (0.0250)   (0.0211) (0.0317) (0.0320) (0.0663) 
         
Observations 1269 1269 497 375 397 1269 585 684 
R-squared 0.960 0.960 0.919 0.798 0.824 0.961 0.966 0.966 
Note: Table 3 only reports the coefficients and thestandard errors of the variables of interest. The dependent variable is the log of the quoted fare of a 
return ticket sold in Italy (FARE). All models include carrier-route specific fixed effects and period fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by route 
and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The theoretical analysis provides two main arguments concerning the price behaviour of FSCs. 
One point is that the entry of LCCs reduces fares in the weak market and possibly increases them in 
the strong one. The other is that fare differentials (between the strong and the weak market) will 
decrease (or at least remain unchanged) when one moves from one to two FSCs. In Table 4 we 
summarize the main testable predictions of the theoretical model and the corresponding empirical 
outcomes. 
Models 3-5 analyse the impact of the entry of LCCs on the fare structure. 17  We observe a 
clear pattern indicating a negative and statistically significant impact of     on fares in the leisure 
segment and in the intermediate segment, and a positive and statistically significant increase for the 
business segment. This confirms the theoretical result that this outcome is likely to emerge if there is 
a sufficient cost difference between LCCs and FSCs and inter-group externalities are at work.  
Quite interestingly, we also find that       has a negative sign for the leisure and the 
intermediate classes (even if it is not significant), and a positive and highly significant value for the 
business class. The rationale behind this result is that higher market shares (and therefore higher 
frequencies and higher quality of the product offered) allow carriers to charge higher fares in the 
business segment; however, it also induces the FSCs to play more aggressively on the leisure 
segment in order to attract a large number of leisure passengers to fill the excessi capacity. These 
opposite effects may be the reason for the low significance of       when we use a single variable 
for all classes. 
Models 6-8 can be used to investigate the relationship between class prices and market 
structure. Since our database does not include cases where the number of FSCs change on the same 
route, the empirical analysis cannot address the question whether fares reduce or increase by 
moving from a case with one FSC to another with two FSCs. However, our data are useful in 
                                                          
17
 The leisure category consists of classes 1-3 (class 3 is the reference case); the intermediate category consists 
of classes 4 and 5 (5 is the reference case); The business category consists of classes 6, 7 and 8 (6 is the 
reference case). 
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capturing price differentials. Variables        and        are employed for this goal. Equations 
(20) and (21) describe FSC fares in the leisure and, the business segments when there are one or two 
FSCs: 
       
              
   ,        
              
          ,        (20) 
       
              
   ,        
              
          ,        (21) 
 
where      and      summarize all the variables of (19) that are not present in (20) and (21), 
when there are, respectively, one or two FSCs. Then, it follows that: 
                
           
                   
   ,        (22) 
                
           
                   
            (23) 
 
Therefore, fare differentials are:                                 that can also be 
interpreted as         
           
             
           
      i.e. the difference between the 
fare gap when there is only one FSC and when there are two FSCs. Table 4 shows that this gap is 
positive and statistically significant for Models 7 and 8, in line with the theoretical outcome. 
Therefore, we find that fare gaps reduce when moving towards more competitive environments, 
and that the ICC is likely to be slack in non-monopolistic markets.  
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                                                                                                               Table 4 – Hypothesis testing 
     
PROPOSITION(S) MODEL PREDICTIONS TEST p-value MODEL 
     
3,4 Low-cost entry decreases full-service fares in the weak market          0.014** Model 3 
3,4 Low-cost entry increases full-service fares in the strong market          0.036** Model 5 
3,4 Low-cost entry increases fare differentials               0.000*** Models 3-5 
     
2,4 Fare differences moving from one to two FSCs decrease (full sample)               0.135 Model 6 
     
2 Fare differences moving from one to two FSCs decrease (with no low-cost)               0.015** Model 7 
     
4 Fare differences moving from one to two FSCs decrease (with low-cost)               0.036** Model 8 
     
     
 OTHER RELEVANT RESULTS    
     
 Market shares positively affects high fares, but         0.002*** Model 5 
     
 have no significant result on fares in other classes         
        
0.728 
0.202 
Model 3 
Model 4 
     
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have investigated the pricing behaviour of FSCs by generalizing a simple view of the 
functioning of the market proposed by Borenstein and Rose (2004). We have relaxed the assumption of 
market independency, and we have accounted for inter-group effects. The empirical evidence concerning 
the European market provides some support for our conclusions. When the market structure moves from 
monopoly to duopoly, the price gap reduces suggesting that the quality premium constraint becomes slack. 
Therefore, in competitive environments, third-degree and second-degree price discrimination approaches 
give the same results. Nevertheless, the latter provides more stringent conclusions on the effects of the 
‘peer’ competition in the market. This also helps to enrich the debate concerning market structure and 
price dispersion. Moreover, we have shown how inter-group effects may have some impact on pricing 
behaviour in the second-degree price discrimination approach through relaxing the quality premium 
constraint and allowing the FSCs to charge larger price differentials between restricted and unrestricted 
fares. This aspect is too often neglected in the analysis of markets and could be the subject of future 
research. 
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Appendix 
Analysis of four distinct competition cases 
In this Appendix, we will investigate in turn the properties of four cases of competition in the aviation 
market, viz. monopoly, symmetric duopoly, asymmetric duopoly, and asymmetric oligopoly. 
 
A1. Monopoly analysis  
Proof of Proposition 1. Part a): We analyse the conditions under which profit maximizing prices are given 
by (9). First note that, when the market   is partially covered, the location of the indifferent consumer of 
type   is given by       
 
 
 , and when the monopolist position is in      is given by:              . 
Therefore, demand in market   is                         . When the market   is fully covered, 
demand in market   is simply   . During the analysis we assume that the weak market is partially covered.  
There are four cases of interest that we will now to briefly analyse. The first one is that considered in 
Section 2.2, i.e. full coverage of the strong market and the ICC is binding (case A). The second is when there 
is partial coverage of the strong market and the ICC is binding (case B). The third is when there is partial 
coverage of the strong market and the ICC is not binding (case C). Finally, there is the case in which the 
strong market is covered but the ICC is not binding (case D).  
We start by analysing case C and then study the conditions under which we move to case B or D, and finally 
to case A. The problem can be easily tackled without using the Lagrange multiplier approach.  
In case C (partial coverage of the strong market and the ICC is slack), the profit maximizing problem is, 
therefore: 
                
                            
              (A1) 
From first-order conditions, we have:     
 
 
        , with        Using (3), it implies that the ICC is 
slack if and only if : 
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                  .    (A2) 
To be in case C, however, we also need that      or, in equilibrium, that          , and therefore, 
that the total utility received by consumers of type   is less than the sum of overall costs. Otherwise, i.e. 
when: 
         ,      (A3) 
the monopolist will prefer to offer full coverage of the strong market, i.e. to move from case C to case B. 
Note that, in case B, where the ICC is slack, and there is full coverage of the strong market, the monopolist 
charges a price   
           , which is sufficient to extract all the utility from the farthest consumer of 
type   in the strong market, and     
 
 
         in the weak market. This case holds until equation (3) is 
not binding, or:                    . Note that the previous inequality is stronger than (A2) since 
it can be written as                                 , where the last term is positive due to 
the full coverage of the strong market. When:  
                                  (A4) 
we are in the case described in Section 2.2 (case A) provided that there is partial coverage of the weak 
market, i.e.:         . Using (6), and remembering that            , we obtain therefore that: 
                  .     (A5) 
Inequalities (A3)-(A5) correspond to assumptions (5)-(7). Case B is analogous to case A, when, in inequality 
(A4), the sign “ ” is replaced by “ ”. 
Part b) is in the text. 
A2. Symmetric duopoly analysis  
Proof of Proposition 2. Parts a), c)-e) are in the text. Part b) We analyse the case when the ICC is binding 
(the other case has already been presented in Section 2.3), i.e. when                    . 
Without loss of generality, we consider the pricing decision of firm  . Using (2), the indifferent consumer on 
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the arc    is simply:    
 
               and the market share of firm   on market   is   . Therefore, 
the maximization problem of firm  , after using (3), is: 
     
 
 
 
       
  
                
 
 
 
         
  
              (A6) 
Taking the first-order derivative and imposing symmetry, we obtain equation (13). 
Part c): We show it for    . Using (9) and (11), the price difference between monopoly and duopoly in the 
strong market is positive if:  
                            (A7) 
From (7), it follows that (A7) is certainly satisfied if                  , or        , which is 
satisfied when    .   
Part d) is clear from the text. 
 
A3. Asymmetric duopoly analysis  
The indifferent consumers of type     and     are simultaneously obtained by solving the following system: 
 
                                                               
                                
     (A6) 
We obtain:     
 
 
 
 
   
         and     
 
 
 
 
   
         
    
        
. 
Now, the profit maximization of the FSC is given by: 
                                   ,   (A7) 
where                                  is the ICC. Note that, although we are considering a 
situation where LCCs have no direct impact on the strong market, prices in the strong market are, however, 
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affected by two channels. First, due to the ICC,     is linked to         second,     is also affected by 
          , depending on the price choice of the LCC. 
The profit maximization of the LCC is given by: 
                            (A8) 
Taking the first-order derivatives, we obtain the equilibrium prices reported in (15) and (16). Note that the 
equilibrium prices when the ICC is slack are given by (16) with     in the weak market and        
     in the strong market. Substituting the previous expressions in (3), after some computations we find 
that the ICC is binding when: 
       
 
 
        
 
 
                             (A9) 
where                     . Under (7), this restriction is always satisfied exept when   is very large, a 
case we exclude from our analysis. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Part a) of the proposition directly follows from previous discussion. Part b) directly 
follows by comparing (9) and (16).  
In order to prove part c), we compute the price difference      (    ) between the monopoly and the 
asymmetric duopoly case in the weak (strong) market. Using  (9) and (16), we obtain: 
      
 
 
        
 
 
                 
 
 
    
 
 
 ,     (A10) 
      
 
 
        
 
 
                 
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
  
            (A11) 
The first term is non-positive by assumption. The second term is positive by condition A2. Finally, the last 
two/three terms are positive. Therefore, the price difference can be simultaneously negative in the weak 
market and positive in the strong market if: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
        
 
 
                 
 
 
    
 
 
              ,         (A12) 
38 
 
i.e. the cost differentials are sufficiently high. 
 
A4. Asymmetric oligopoly analysis  
Consider the three regions of the circumference as separated by the three carriers:       
 
 ,     
 
  
 
  
and     
 
   . Due to the presence of LCCs,    -type and    -type consumers located in the same place 
may prefer to patronize different carriers. Using equations (1) and (2), the utility that a    -type traveller 
located in         
 
  receives when patronizing the FSC    is:                    
   11   10 1  1  ,     1, and the utility she receives when patronizing the LCC is: 
                                                 , where      and      are, 
respectively, the number of    -type and    -type passengers travelling with the FSC    on the arc 
      
 
 , and analogously for     ,     ,      and     . Similarly, the utility that a    -type traveller 
located in       
 
  
 
  receives when patronizing the FSC    is:                    
   11   10 1  1  ,     1, and the utility she receives when patronizing the LCC is: 
                                                 . Finally, the utility that a    -type 
traveller located in       
 
    receives when patronizing the FSC    is:                    
   11   10 1  1  ,     1, and when patronizing the FSC    is: 
                                                . The utility of      -type consumer is 
as previously described by imposing    . 
Using the previous expressions and solving for the indifferent consumer, after some computations, it is 
possible to derive the market shares of the three firms as a function of the three prices, and, after 
substituting them in the profit functions and solving a 3-equation system of the first order conditions, we 
obtain the equilibrium prices reported in equations (13) and (14). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Part a) of the proposition directly follows from the previous discussion. Part b) 
holds since in the asymmetric duopoly the ICC is binding, while in the asymmetric oligopoly it is not. In 
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order to prove part c), we compute the price difference      between the asymmetric oligopoly case and 
the symmetric duopoly case in the weak market. Using  (11) and (18), we obtain: 
      
 
 
        
 
  
   
 
 
     
        
 .    (A13) 
Here there are two sources of price reduction. The first is due to the cost advantage of the LCCs, which 
induces the FSCs to reduce their prices; the second is due to proximity of the LCC, which induce more 
competition. Inter-group effects play in the opposite direction. Since     remains unchanged (      ), 
conditions their guaranteeing a price fall in the weak market are also those that imply an increase in price 
differences when moving from a symmetric duopoly to an asymmetric duopoly. 
 
 
